Al-Qa'ida in Iraq - a Bloody New Chapter

17 May 2010
As Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi "Al-Husayni al-Qurashi" is sworn in as the new emir of the faithful in Iraq (succeeding Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu-Ayyub al-Masri, both of whom were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid) a new chapter begins for Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), a chapter that may prove even more bloody than those that have gone before.

AQI has faced numerous problems from the outset since its foundation by Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in the early days of the US occupation of Iraq. The organization's leadership did not choose Al-Zarqawi for this mission, as it preferred Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi, who was close to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qa'ida leadership. The gulf between the two parties widened after Al-Zaraqawi embarked on 'ijtihadat" [independent judgment], which did not please the Al-Qa'idah leadership, such as the murder of Western hostages in a gruesome way and videotaping them, and the application of Islamic shar'iah punishment against some Iraqi nationals, such as cutting smokers' fingers off, and executing others without following the shari'ah tenets enshrined [in the Koran]. Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed "reservations" about all this in his famous letter to Al-Zarqawi, which the US occupation forces published and which later proved to be genuine.

It is no exaggeration to say that the killing of both Al-Qa'idah leaders in Iraq, Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu-Ayyub al-Masri, will strengthen rather than weaken the organization, because it ended the dual leadership and opened the way for the appointment of an "Iraqi national" with noble lineage, and one who belongs to the House of the Prophet and to the Quraysh tribe. That is what we gathered from that fact that he was given the attributes of "Al-Husayni and al-Qurashi" after his nom de guerre.

Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi's most important mission will be to close the ranks of his the organization members and attract new recruits, capitalizing on the current circumstances in Iraq, most notably the collapse of the political process and the return to previous sectarian alignments, which the recent elections highlighted, along with the political polarizations resulting from these elections.

The new AQI is shrouded in mystery. We know his nom de guerre, but information about him is little if not nonexistent. It is not unlikely that his identity will remain unknown for months or years, as the organization has learned from its mistakes and now deliberately pursues a vague policy to conceal the identity of its new leaders, particularly in Iraq.

Remarkably, the bloody blasts that are attributed to the organization have recently increased, specifically since the assassination of both its leaders. Hardly a week passes without dozens, and sometimes hundreds, killed. If news that the organization is behind these blasts is true, this indicates that the organization's strength is growing and that it is restoring its most bloody eras of 2005 and 2006, when the number of blasts reached a peak.

It is no longer a secret to say that the main objective of AQI - in addition to fighting the occupation - is to foment a civil, sectarian war leading to dragging neighbouring Sunni countries into the war to save and protect their brothers from the Shi'i sect. The organization includes extremist salafi elements who refuse to recognize the Shi'i creed and hold its followers as infidel.

Ironically, the Shi'i coalition that is emerging forcefully these days and that is acting to from the new government is, wittingly or unwittingly, facilitating the AQI's bloody mission, because this alliance that is being forged by Ammar al-Hakim and Nuri al-Maliki primarily relies on the sectarian factor.

Perhaps the greatest mistake that the ruling Shi'i coalition has made was to deal with the awakening forces extemporaneously by failing to accommodate larger numbers of the awakening forces members in the security and military forces and in other civil institutions of the state. This prompted and may prompt some of them and of their sons to return to AQI, thanks to the frustration they feel as a result of their exclusion in their own homeland.

The AQI leadership is now purely Iraqi, something that will deprive the Iraqi government and its loyalists of the card they have long used to alienate Iraqis from AQI on the pretext that both the organization (al-Qa'ida central) and AQI tself were led by non-Iraqis. This is a serious development that might result in bloodier confrontations in the months ahead, particularly if the current state of sectarian polarization continues and if the Shi'i coalition succeeds in forming a new government.